Abstract: This paper attempts to provide an overview of risk assessment and management practice in underground rock engineering based on a review of the international literature and some personal experience. It is noted that the terminologies used in risk assessment and management studies may vary from country to country. Probabilistic risk analysis is probably the most widely-used approach to risk assessment in rock engineering and in geotechnical engineering more broadly. It is concluded that great potential exists to augment the existing probabilistic methods by the use of Bayesian networks and decision analysis techniques to allow reasoning under uncertainty and to update probabilities, material properties and analyses as further data become available throughout the various stages of a project. Examples are given of the use of these methods in underground excavation engineering in China and elsewhere, and opportunities for their further application are identified.
Introduction
 This paper has been prepared as a contribution to the International Summit Forum on Safe Construction and Risk Management of Major Underground Construction held in Wuhan, China, in May 2012, and sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE). The topics listed for consideration by the Forum are:
(1) Mechanism, understanding, prediction theory and warning systems of rockburst, collapse, water inrush, or large deformation of major underground engineering.
(2) Optimal design methodology of major underground engineering under conditions of high stress, karst, high water pressure, or weak rocks.
(3) Risk management methods and strategies for safe construction of major underground engineering under conditions of high stress, karst, high water pressure, or weak rocks.
This paper seeks to contribute to the consideration of the third of these topics by providing an overview Doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1235 .00193  Corresponding author. Tel: +61 7 3721 5451; E-mail: tbrown@golder.com.au of the application of risk assessment and risk management in underground rock engineering, based largely on a review of the international literature. Clearly, the topics of the Forum are of great concern in China and to the CAE, as they are elsewhere in the world. However, it is important not to lose sight of the monumental achievements of rock mechanics and rock engineering in China in recent years (Feng, 2011; Feng and Hudson, 2011; Qian, 2011) .
Risk management terminology and fundamentals
The international literature on risk analysis, assessment and management contains a range of definitions of risk and associated terms (Paté-Cornell and Dillon, 2006) . Here, the definitions given by AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009 (Standards Australia, 2009) will be used. It should be noted that these definitions differ, sometimes marginally and sometimes significantly, from those used in some earlier publications, including those by Brown (2007) and Brown and Booth (2009) . The author understands that there is not a specific Chinese risk management standard comparable to AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009. Following Zhou and Zhang (2011) , it will be assumed that the general principles of the International Standards Organisation (ISO) standard, ISO 31000: 2009, will apply.
Standards Australia (2009) defines risk as "the effect of uncertainty on objectives" and a risk source as an "element which alone or in combination has the potential to give rise to a risk". In some earlier accounts, a risk source appears to have been referred to as a hazard, defined in the previous Australian Standard as "a source of potential harm" (Standards Australia, 2004 ). This term is not defined in AS/NZS ISO 31000: 2009. The underground rock engineering conditions of high stress, karst, high water pressure and weak rocks could be regarded as hazards in this sense.
The level of risk is defined as the "magnitude of a
risk or combination of risks, expressed in terms of the combination of consequences and their likelihood".
This definition allows for the common practice of quantifying risk as the product of the likelihood of the occurrence of an event and the consequences of that event (Stacey et al., 2006; Brown, 2007; Brown and Booth, 2009; Einstein et al., 2010) . The Standards Australia (2009) definition of an event as an "occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances" is consistent with this usage. The consequence of an event is the "outcome of an event affecting objectives" and the likelihood is the "chance that something will happen" (Standards Australia, 2009) . As an example of the differences in terminology sometimes encountered, the probability of an event occurring is sometimes referred to as a hazard (Einstein, 1997; He et al., 2011) . Fig. 1 illustrates the overall risk management process adopted by the ISO and Standards Australia (2009) . It helps clarify some of the terminology used in this area. It is important to recognize that, in this approach, the risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation steps are together known as risk assessment, the term used in the title of this paper. Similar approaches, sometimes differing in detail, are used by a number of other national and international authorities (for example, the International Tunnelling Association approach outlined by Eskesen et al. (2004) and the PIARC approach used by Schubert (2011) ). Much of that which follows will be directed towards the risk analysis and evaluation stages identified in Fig. 1 . 
Risk analysis and evaluation
Risk analysis is the process of developing an understanding of each of the risks identified in the previous risk identification step in Fig. 1 . It provides an input to decisions on whether or not risks need to be treated, and on the most appropriate and cost-effective risk treatment strategies. It involves consideration of the sources of risk, their consequences and the likelihood of those consequences occurring. Risks are usually analyzed and evaluated by combining their likelihoods and consequences. Risk analyses may be qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative. The following paragraphs provide brief overviews for some of the risk analysis and evaluation tools that are commonly used in geotechnical engineering and tunneling, and may be suitable for use in large underground construction projects.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) identifies, quantifies and represents, in diagrammatic form, the faults and failures, and the combinations of faults and failures that can lead to a major hazard or event. It may be used either with or without quantifying the probabilities of events occurring.
Event tree analysis (ETA) provides a systematic mapping of realistic event scenarios having the potential to result in a major incident, and the relationships, dependencies and potential escalation of events with time. It also provides numerical estimates of the likelihoods of occurrence of the component events and of the escalated event.
Consequence or cause-consequence analysis is a combination of fault tree and event tree analysis. The outcome is a diagram displaying the relationships between the causes and the consequences or outcomes of an incident. This technique is used most commonly when the failure logic is simple because a diagram combining fault and event trees can become quite complex. Fig. 2 shows a generic risk evaluation process for a stope in an underground mine that uses simple event and fault trees. The possible types of failures are shown in the left hand column with a probability of failure (POF) determined for each. The middle column shows an event tree used to establish several types of risk and their impacts or consequences such as economic loss, the loss of reputation or the impact on workers. The right hand column shows the final evaluation of the acceptability or otherwise of these risks. This general approach, which was developed initially for use in rock slope engineering (Tapia et al., 2007; Steffen et al., 2006) , could well be used for an underground civil engineering excavation, with perhaps a modification to the nature of some of the risks shown in the central column.
Bowtie diagrams show how a range of controls may eliminate or minimize the likelihood of occurrence of specific initiating events that may generate risk, or reduce the consequences of an event once it has occurred. Bowtie diagrams, originated as a technique for analyzing safety incidents, but are also useful for analyzing other types of complex risks and for communicating key risks and critical controls (Quinlivan and Lewis, 2007) . Fig. 3 (Baecher and Christian, 2003; Fenton and Griffiths, 2008) . This approach will be discussed in more detail in Section 5 below.
Decision analysis, including decision tree analysis, is a structured format used to analyze or assess the outcomes of decisions or choices made, based on the available information. Many decisions made in underground construction involve significant uncertainty. Decision analysis will be discussed further in Section 6 below.
Multi-risk
analysis is an approximate computational method of calculation for cases involving multiple statistically independent risks or hazards that are each treated as stochastic variables. It provides a method for dealing with uncertainty and may be used in estimating costs in tunneling, for example the study (Eskesen et al., 2004) . (Stacey et al., 2006) . The Analytical hierarchy process (AHP) approach is used to address ill-defined and ill-structured problems in decision making and risk assessment. It is a mathematical technique for multi-criterion decision-making that allows decision alternatives to be ranked based on preferences through pair-wise comparisons (Saaty, 1980; Taroun and Yang, 2011) . This technique has been used relatively widely in the Chinese construction industry, sometimes in combination with other approaches (Deng and Zhou, 2010; Zhou et al., 2006) .
Bayesian networks are probability-based graphical and mathematical tools that show cause and effect relationships between the components of a system. They allow for conditional dependence between variables, provide a means of reasoning under uncertainty, and allow probability tables to be updated as more information becomes available. In practice, they are usually used in combination with some form of decision analysis. Bayesian networks and their application in underground engineering will be discussed in more detail in Section 6 below.
In addition to, or in association with, Bayesian networks, fuzzy logic and other artificial intelligence (AI) methods which have been applied in rock engineering (Dershowicz and Einstein, 1984; Feng and Jiang, 2010) may also be used in risk analysis and evaluation, sometimes in combination with other approaches (Choi et al., 2004; He et al., 2006; Zhou and Zhang, 2011) .
It is important to note that many of the risk analyses carried out routinely in engineering practice are qualitative or, at best, semi-quantitative (Zhou and Zhang, 2011) . In the remainder of this paper, emphasis will be placed on the development and application of quantitative approaches.
Geotechnical uncertainty and error
It is important to recognize that in geotechnical engineering, including in underground rock engineering, many of the risk sources or hazards arise from geotechnical uncertainty or error. The nature of the uncertainty and the errors that provide the sources of geomechanics risk in geotechnical engineering more broadly has been discussed widely in the literature. For example, Einstein and Baecher (1983) classified the sources of uncertainty as:
(1) inherent spatial and temporal variability; (2) measurement errors (systematic or random); (3) model uncertainty; (4) load uncertainty; and (5) omissions. Baecher and Christian (2003) and others have described these sources of uncertainty as being aleatory or epistemic. Aleatory uncertainty is the irreducible randomness or variability associated with phenomena that are naturally variable in time or space, even when the system is well known. The discontinuity geometries and the mechanical and hydraulic properties of rock masses provide good examples of this natural variability. Epistemic uncertainty, on the other hand, arises from limitations in our fundamental knowledge or understanding of some aspects of a problem. This is sometimes termed conceptual uncertainty (Brown, 2007) and may be reflected in the use of inappropriate models in analyses, for example.
Recently, Hadjigeorgiou and Harrison (2011) provided a valuable account of uncertainty and the sources of error in rock engineering. In discussing the use of rock mass classification schemes in the design of underground excavations, they identified two groups of errors. The first group consists of errors intrinsic to the classification scheme used, including errors of omission, errors of superfluousness, and errors of taxonomy associated with the requirement to select a particular classification rating value for a geomechanical property. The second group of errors are associated with implementation, and include errors of circumstance, errors of convenience, errors of ignoring variability, and errors of ignoring uncertainty (Hadjigeorgiou and Harrison, 2011) .
Probabilistic risk analysis
For the last 30 or 40 years, probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) has probably been the most widely used method of quantitative risk analysis, generally of the risk of failure, in geotechnical engineering more broadly (Baecher and Christian, 2003; Einstein, 1996; Fenton and Griffiths, 2008; Honjo et al., 2009; Event Time Cause Pre-event controls Post-event controls Consequence Juang et al., 2011) . It is also used in construction time and cost estimation (Cretu et al., 2011) and in project management in a wide range of engineering and other fields (Paté-Cornell, 2007) . As illustrated in Fig. 4 , in the general geotechnical probabilistic risk analysis approach we assess a probability density function (PDF). Design parameters such as the loads, stresses, or groundwater pressures, are identified in Fig. 4 as Demand. The strength of the soil or rock, often the shear strength, is identified in Fig. 4 as Capacity. This diagram illustrates how, as we progress from the preliminary to the detailed and then the final design stage, our knowledge of the design parameters improves, or is refined as a result of further investigation, and the probability of failure reduces. Fig. 4 Illustration of uncertainty reduction during the development of a project until the potential for failure is minimized to an acceptable level (Valley et al., 2010 , after Hoek, 1991 . Stewart and O'Rourke (2008) , among others, express the probability of failure when a load exceeds a resistance as:
where R is the resistance or capacity, S is the load or demand and ( ) G X is a limit state function such that ( ) 0 G  X defines the boundary between safe and unsafe. A factor of safety (FOS) is often calculated as / FOS R S  , where, in this case, R and S are the mean or most likely values of the capacity and demand, respectively. Some methods of calculation allow for aleatory uncertainty in the functions for R and S. However, they generally do not allow for epistemic uncertainty, that is a conceptual model or parameter uncertainty. Therefore, in these cases, allowance should be made for model error, ME, in the estimation of R and S:
If G R S   , and R and S are statistically independent, the probability of failure may be calculated as:
where ( ) R F x is the cumulative distribution function of the resistance and s ( ) f x is the probability distribution function of the load. The probability of failure is related to the degree to which the demand and capacity distribution curves overlap as illustrated in Fig. 4 . If both R and S follow normal distributions,
, where  is called the reliability index and is a function of the mean values and the standard deviations of R and S.
The probability distribution functions of R and S are often estimated using Monte Carlo, Latin Hypercube or other types of simulations using commercially available software such as @RISK (Palisade Corporation, 2012) and Crystal Ball (Oracle Corporation, 2012) . In their simplest form, these simulations consist of repeated calculations of values of R and S, generally using equations involving a range of input parameters such as those used in stability calculations, selected on a random number basis.
It is often assumed that the probability distribution functions involved in these simulations are normal distributions. In the case of the geotechnical variables used in the estimation of values of capacity and demand, this can be a far from reasonable assumption. The distributions assumed can have significant effects on the results of analyses. In most engineering applications, including in geotechnical engineering, it is also important to identify the time frame over which the probability of failure is assessed. For some items of major infrastructure, it may be overly conservative to base decisions on the probability of a single failure occurring over the lifetime of the structure. An average annual probability of failure may be more realistic in some instances (Stewart and Love, 2005) .
The probability of failure may be related to the FOS which engineers have traditionally used and often prefer. Table 1 shows probabilities of failure and the associated FOSs calculated for coal mine pillars in an Australian database compiled by Galvin et al. (1999) . It must be remembered that the f P -FOS relationship is not unique as is sometimes supposed, but depends on the input data, the boundary conditions and the nature of the distributions of R and S resulting in each case. (Galvin et al., 1999) . Furthermore, this simple probabilistic approach does not permit us conveniently to allow for spatial variability, uncertainties, effects of pre-or post-event controls, dependent relationships between the design parameters and variables, and parallel component failure in an engineering system. There is a vast body of literature discussing the wide range of probability-based techniques used in geotechnical engineering, often in combination with numerical stress, deformation and water flow analyses, and in many other fields of engineering (Baecher and Christian, 2003; Fenton and Griffiths, 2008; Paté-Cornell, 2007; Stewart and Melchers, 1997) . Only the simplest case has been introduced here in order to provide an indication of the nature of probabilistic risk analysis.
Bayesian networks and dynamic Bayesian networks for quantitative risk analysis
Many of the complexities referred to above may be taken into account using a Bayesian network (BN) approach. BNs are based on Bayes' theorem or Bayes' law which is a relationship between probabilities developed by Thomas Bayes (Bayes, 1763) . In its simplest form, Bayes' theorem may be written as:
where ( ) P A is the probability of A, ( ) P B is the probability of B, and ( ) P A B and ( ) P B A are the conditional probabilities of A given that B has occurred, and those of B given A. In the Bayesian interpretation, probability measures a degree of belief so that what will be referred to here as Bayesian networks is sometimes referred to as Bayesian belief networks (Charles River Analytics, 2008; Lee et al., 2009) . A more complex way of expressing Bayes' theorem includes a hypothesis, past experience, and evidence:
where we can update our belief in hypothesis H given additional evidence, E, and the background context or past experience, c. The left-hand term, ( , ) P H E c is called the posterior probability of hypothesis H after considering the effect of the evidence of the past experience, c. The term ( ) P H c is called the a priori probability of H given c alone. The term ( , ) P E H c is called the likelihood and gives the probability of the evidence assuming that the hypothesis, H, and the background information, c, are true (Charles River Analytics, 2008). Fig. 5 illustrates the components of a simple Bayesian network, notably (1) the causal model shown by the nodes and their links, and the probability tables forming the Bayesian network itself; (2) the input of expert knowledge; and (3) the use of inference in decision-making (Smith, 2006) . In geotechnical engineering, dynamic BNs which allow for changes in the decisions, relationships and probabilities with time are especially useful. In this approach, the probability tables for the variables involved may be updated as more information becomes available during the lifetime of the project.
There are many ways of defining and describing BNs. Formally, a BN may be defined as a concise graphical representation of the joint probability of a domain that is represented by a set of random variables (Russell and Norvig, 2009; Sousa and Einstein, 2012) . In summary, it may be said that a BN:
(1) is a graphical and mathematical tool or causal model showing cause and effect relationships between the components of a system; (2) represents the variables in a system as nodes and their dependencies by directional links; (3) quantifies the strengths of these dependencies by conditional probabilities; (4) allows for both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in assessing probabilities;
(5) allows the probabilistic model (generally probability tables) to be updated as new information becomes available, for example as a result of further site investigation or monitoring during excavation; (6) synthesizes and unifies knowledge related to the problem; (7) uses reasoning under uncertainty by means of inferences; and (8) can substitute for both fault and event trees. Fig. 6 illustrates the concept of the unification of expert knowledge and mathematical reasoning for a given problem or domain in a BN. Fig. 7 shows an example of a simple BN. The arrows going from one variable to another reflect the relationships between the variables represented by the nodes. For example, the arrows going from C to B1 and B2 indicate that C has a direct influence on both B1 and B2. In order to obtain results or answers, inference is used to compute answers to queries made to the network (Sousa and Einstein, 2012) . The two most common types of queries made are the a priori probability distribution of a variable and the posterior distribution of variables in the light of evidence, generally available from observations made. The a priori probability distribution of a variable may be written as:
where A is the query variable and X 1 to X k are the remaining variables in the network. This type of query can be used in the design phase of an underground excavation, for example, to assess the probability of failure under certain design assumptions concerning geology, geotechnical properties and hydrogeology. The posterior distribution of variables given evidence or observations is given by
where e is a vector of all the evidence. This type of query is used to update knowledge of the state of one variable, or variables, when other variables (the evidence variables) are observed. This sort of query could be used to update the probability of failure of an underground excavation, for example, after construction has started and new information on the geology, hydrogeology or geotechnical properties becomes available (Sousa and Einstein, 2012) . The simplest, but least efficient, way of carrying out inferences with this approach is to use these equations to calculate the probabilities of every possible combination of values of the variables and identify those needed to obtain the result. Several algorithms are available for carrying out efficient exact and approximate inference in BNs. The most commonly used exact inference method is the variable elimination algorithm (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Sousa and Einstein, 2012) .
In practice, decision analysis is often used in conjunction with BNs as part of an overall risk management and decision-making approach (Smith, 2010) . Decision analysis is a well-developed specialist field that has been defined in a variety of ways. Paté-Cornell and Dillon (2006) , for example, regarded it as the classic expected-utility framework based on the axioms of rational choices (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) together with methods of problem structuring, probability assessment, single and multi-attribute preference assessment, modeling approaches such as decision trees, influence diagrams, and sensitivity analysis. Others adopt fewer restrictive definitions which include methods such as the analytic hierarchy process (Saaty, 1980) . Detailed examples of the use of decision analysis in conjunction with BNs are given by He et al. (2011) and Sousa and Einstein (2012) . Fig. 8 shows the basic structure of the construction strategy decision model used by Sousa and Einstein (2012) . In this case, the decision model is based on a decision graph which is a BN (greatly simplified as shown in Fig. 8 ) extended to model different actions or alternatives and the associated utilities or consequences. The model shows two chance nodes (geological condition and failure mode), one decision node (construction strategy) and one utility node (the total cost), which represents the sum of the costs associated with the different construction strategies and the utilities associated with failure. The model determines the optimal or best alternatives based on the maximization of utility, for example by the minimization of risk or of cost (Sousa and Einstein, 2012) . Currently, BNs are used throughout the world, including in China, to assess probabilities and risks in an extremely wide range of fields including sciences, medicine (particularly in medical diagnosis), criminal forensics, several fields of engineering including the construction industry, project management and in the finance and insurance industries-in fact, in any field that involves relationships between probabilities. In geotechnical and underground engineering, BNs have been applied to risk assessment and management in dam engineering (Smith, 2006) , in tunneling (Sousa and Einstein, 2007, 2012; Špačková and Straub, 2011) , in electric power industry construction projects (Jia et al., 2011) , in assessing the rock fall hazards along highways (Straub and Schubert, 2008) , in assessing natural threats or hazards (Einstein and Sousa, 2006; Einstein et al., 2010) , in the underground injection of carbon dioxide (He et al., 2011) , and in a particularly sophisticated case of a deep foundation pit construction project for the Shanghai Metro (Zhou and Zhang, 2011) .
In geotechnical engineering more broadly, BNs are perhaps most commonly used to update probability tables, model parameters, analyses and design curves as more data become available following further investigation or during construction (Christian and Baecher, 2011; Najjar and Saad, 2011; Sousa and Einstein, 2012) . Recognizing the power of BNs in this regard, Christian and Baecher (2011) asked recently, "Why haven't we used it (Bayes' theorem) to bring the observational method into the 21st century?"
Applications to underground rock engineering
In the author's experience, risk assessment and management techniques are applied most commonly in underground engineering projects through a qualitative or a semi-quantitative approach. Generally, a risk register is developed, identifying the risk events potentially associated with the project in each of several disciplinary fields (such as geotechnical or rock engineering); the likelihoods and consequences of each of these risk events; the control, counter, mitigation measures planned or required to be put in place (see Fig. 3) ; the residual risks existing following the implementation of these control measures; and the "ownership" of the risk. A formal means of updating the risks following the implementation of control measures will be outlined below. It would normally be expected that the risks associated with events such as rockbursts, large deformations, collapses, karst, water inrushes and weak rock would be listed in such a risk register. The consequences may be a range of economic or non-economic impacts on the project, such as those identified in Fig. 2 . Likelihoods are usually assessed over a given period of time.
Most organizations use this approach to develop likelihood and consequence ratings for each risk event by providing overall risk ratings based on qualitative or semi-quantitative scales. These ratings may be updated throughout the development of a project from the conceptual and various design stages through to construction. A typical qualitative risk determination matrix and the associated general risk management options for risk levels E, H, M and L are shown in Table 2 . Table 2 Qualitative risk determination matrix and risk management options (Brown and Booth, 2009) . As discussed in Section 5, quantitative probabilistic risk analysis is now widely used in geotechnical and underground rock engineering. And as noted in Section 6, the extension of quantitative probabilistic methods through the use of BNs and decision analysis is now practiced commonly, if not universally, in a number of fields, including underground rock engineering and construction engineering more generally. These methods would appear to have great potential to contribute to the improved assessment and management of the risks encountered in underground rock engineering projects. It is considered that they could be applied to greater effect during the site investigation, in the various stages of project development and design, in construction time and cost estimation, and in the construction management stages of underground rock engineering projects.
An approach suggested for adaptation and adoption in underground rock engineering is that developed by Einstein for dealing with natural geotechnical threats or hazards (Einstein, 1997; Einstein and Sousa, 2007; Einstein et al., 2010) . This approach uses the structure of decision making under uncertainty to formalize the risk assessment process for natural threats or for geotechnically-related threats of the types being considered here. In Einstein's terminology, potential threats or events are combined with a probability to express a hazard. This in turn is combined with consequences to express a risk, R, as:
where [ ] P T is the probability of the threat or hazard, and ( ) u C is the utility of the consequences where C is a vector of attributes using a multiattribute approach (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) .
The fact that the consequences are uncertain, often called the vulnerability, is expressed by the conditional probability, [ ] P T C , so that the risk may be expressed as:
Assuming that as a result of the active control or mitigation measures (e.g. support or drainage) put in place as discussed earlier in this section 
, or reduce the consequences from ( ) u C to ( ) u  C , or both. The implementation of control measures involves costs, so that the reduced risk for active counter measures can be written as:
where ( ) u CA is the utility, or in simpler terms, the cost, of the active counter measures. Similar expressions can be formulated for passive counter measures or for combinations of active and passive controls. Einstein and Sousa (2007) also showed how Bayesian updating can be used to represent the fact that not all control measures may be 100% effective in practice.
A detailed account of the general rock engineering design process has been given by Feng and Hudson (2011) , which represents the outcome of the work of the Commission on Rock Engineering Design Methodology of the International Society for Rock Mechanics in the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . Although the book has many outstanding features and is to be highly recommended, it does not include any specific formal treatment of risk assessment and management methods, although these topics are considered indirectly or implicitly throughout the book. It is suggested that the formal, quantitative methods of risk assessment and management outlined above could be a suitable topic for consideration in the future work of the Commission and in future editions of the book by Feng and Hudson (2011) .
Although, as discussed in Section 6 and earlier in this Section, the literature contains a number of examples of the advanced use of risk assessment and management methods in underground rock engineering, in geotechnical engineering more broadly, and in construction management in China, it is suspected that, as is generally the case elsewhere in the world, greater use could be made in China of both the more routine qualitative and semi-qualitative and the more formal quantitative methods of risk assessment summarized in this paper. Although more than four years have passed since their paper's publication, a study reported by Tang et al. (2007) identified some advances made, and some scope for improvement, in the use of risk management in the Chinese construction industry. 
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to provide an overview of risk assessment and management practice in underground rock engineering based on a review of the international literature and some personal experience. The contributions made by Einstein, Sousa and their co-workers were found to be especially informative (Einstein, 1996 (Einstein, , 1997 Einstein and Baecher, 1983; Einstein and Sousa, 2007; Einstein et al., 2010; He et al., 2011; Sousa, 2010; Sousa and Einstein, 2007, 2012) .
The terminologies used in risk assessment and management studies may vary from country to country. Probabilistic risk analysis is probably the most widely-used approach to risk assessment in rock engineering and in geotechnical engineering more broadly. It is concluded that great potential exists to augment the existing probabilistic methods by the use of Bayesian Networks and decisionmaking analysis techniques to allow reasoning under uncertainty and to update probabilities, material properties and analyses as further data become available through the various stages of an underground project. Examples have been given of the use of these more formal methods in underground excavation engineering in China and elsewhere, and opportunities for their further application have been identified. It is suggested that the risks associated with events such as rockbursts, large deformations, collapses, karst, water inrushes and weak rock could be assessed and managed using these methods. Finally, it is suggested that an opportunity exists to incorporate these methods into the rock engineering design methodology developed by Feng and Hudson (2011) .
